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Bruce H. Wildsmith* The Mi'kmaq and the Fishery:
Beyond Food Requirements
The Mi'kmaq, the traditional Aboriginal nation in Nova Scotia, are struggling to
find their place in the modern fishery. Significant milestones have been achieved,
including the Denny, Paul and Sylliboy (N.S.C.A.) case establishing the right of
the Mi'kmaq to harvest fish for food and the Simon (S.C.C.) case affirming the
continuing validityof the Mi'kmaq Treatyof 1752, a treaty that contains an express
right to sell fish. Though fishing by the Mi'kmaq for food no longer appears to be
a subject of controversy (assuming the needs of conservation have been met),
the spectre of commercial aspects to the Mi'kmaq fishery is meeting resistance.
This paperexplains the background to these developments andcomments on the
future role of the Mi'kmaq in the commercial fishery. The author argues that the
present collapse in the fishery was not the fault of the Mi'kmaq and the Mi'kmaq
should be accorded a priority in future harvesting. Further, Mi'kmaq participation
and resource management raise issues of self-government that must resolved
through Mi'kmaq governmental mechanisms.
Introduction: The Simon Case
When the first Europeans arrived in present-day North America, they
found a land inhabited by Aboriginal people who were self-governing
and self-sufficient. The resources of the lands and waters were harvested
to sustain the people; the resources were the basis of a life-style and
economy. Initially the Europeans sought to share in the bounty of the
resources; eventually they sought to settle on the land. In so settling, the
Europeans sought to develop relationships and understandings with the
Aboriginal peoples, as well as between and amongst the European
powers themselves.
The Mi'kmaq are one of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada and
traditionally occupied territory they called "Mi'kma'ki". Mi'kma'ki
extends through five Canadian provinces from the Gaspe Peninsula of
Quebec, along New Brunswick's north shore and as far inland as the St.
John River watershed (the traditional territory of the Malecite), all of
present-day Prince Edward Island, all of present-day Nova Scotia includ-
ing Cape Breton Island, and the south coast of Newfoundland. This
northeastern corner of North America featured the earliest contact in
Canada between European explorers, fishermen and settlers, and the
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Aboriginal occupants; it was the site of part of the struggle between the
British and French in the 18th Century for dominance as the preeminent
European force in North America.
During this period of European rivalry, the British established the basis
for their relationship with the Mi'kmaq through a series of treaties,
perhaps best thought of as a chain of covenants, with various links forged
during the 1700s. The earliest known Indian treaty directly referring to
present-day Nova Scotia was signed in 17251 and ratified at Annapolis
Royal in 17262 and at St. John in 17283. The most recent treaties were in
176 14, though other treaties were signed around the time of the American
Revolution with Mi'kmaq from the Miramichi, Restigouche, Richibucto
and Shediac areas of New Brunswick and the Gaspe in 17791. Over time,
these treaties were largely lost to the conscious mind of the colonial
authorities, and ignored by historians. Though the Mi'kmaq remembered
the treaties and from time-to-time reminded Her Majesty of them6, their
reminders were without legal or political effect until the Supreme Court
of Canada spoke in 1985 in the case of James Matthew Simon v. The
Queen7 .
1. The treaties may be found in various sources. The originals were usually sent by colonial
governments to the officials in London, England who were responsible for colonial affairs,
namely, the Board of Trade. They are usually housed in the Public Record Office in Kew, a
suburb of London. The documents are usually classified as Colonial Office records, and are
contained in numerous volumes. One of the severe problems in dealing with Indian treaties is
that they were not catalogued systematically, and were at times made with military or civilian
officers who did not necessarily report to colonial governors or the Board of Trade; hence,
important interactions and documents with Aboriginal peoples may be recorded in a variety of
sources that have not been systematically surveyed. Microfilm copies of major colonial
documents are found in the public archives and universities in Canada, such as the National
Archives of Canada ("NAC") in Ottawa and the Public Archives of Nova Scotia (PANS) in
Halifax. A number of documents have been published in typescripted, printed form, easing
access and improving legibility of documents that are in the original handwritten. See e.g. W.
E. Daugherty, Maritime Indian Treaties in Perspective (Ottawa: DIAND, 1983); TheMi'kmaq
Treaty Handbook (Sydney: Native Communications Society of Nova Scotia, 1987). The 1725
treaties are a series of documents found at C.O. 217/38.
2. C.O. 217/4, p. 320 and 217/38, p. 100-09.
3. For an article providing a Malecite (or Maliseet) perspective on the 1725-28 treaties, see
Andrea Bear Nicholas, "Mascarene's Treaty of 1725" (1994) 43 U.N.B.L.J. 3.
4. Various treaties with groups of Mi'kmaq from present-day Nova Scotia were signed in the
years 1760-61. One that ilvolved the Cape Breton Mi'kmaq, as well as Mi'kmaq from
Miramichi, Shediac, and Pogmouch, was signed on June 25, 1761 and is found at C.O. 217/18.
Another with the Mi'kmaq of Pictou and Merigomish was completed October 12, 1762: PANS
RG1, vol. 165, p. 187.
5. C.O. 217/54, p. 221-23.
6. E.g., Feb. 10, 1825 Petition of Chief Adelah to Lord Bathurst, attaching copy of 1760
Treaty: C.O. 217/145. The Mi'kmaq also attempted to gain judicial recognition of the Treaty
of 1752 through a court case in the 1920s: R. v. Sylliboy, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 307 (S.C.C.).
7. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387,62 N.R. 366,71 N.S.R.(2d) 15,171 A.P.R. 15,23 C.C.C. (3d) 238.
[hereinafter cited to S.C.R.].
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The Simon case recognized that the Treaty of 1752, signed by the
Governor and Council in Halifax with a Mi'kmaq Chief, Jean Baptiste
Cope, was a valid Indian treaty, still in full force and effect. To the extent
that the Crown felt otherwise, the burden was on the Crown to show
termination, extinguishment, or limitation. In Simon the Supreme Court
states:
Given the serious and far-reaching consequences of a finding that a treaty
right has been extinguished, it seems appropriate to demand strict proof
of the fact of extinguishment in each case where the issue arises.' [Empha-
sis added]
As to whether the Treaty of 1752 was terminated by hostilities, Chief
Justice Dickson reflected on what the British authorities had in fact done.
He states:
I would note that there is nothing in the British conduct subsequent to
the conclusion of the Treaty of 1752 and the alleged hostilities to indicate
that the Crown considered the terms of the Treaty at an end. Indeed, His
Majesty's Royal Instructions of December 9, 1761, addressed inter alia to
the Governor of Nova Scotia, declared that the Crown "was detennined
upon all occasions to support and protect the... Indians in their just rights
and possessions and to keep inviolable the treaties and compacts which
have been entered into with them ... " These Royal Instructions formed
the basis of the Proclamation issued by Jonathan Belcher, Lieutenant
Governor of Nova Scotia on May 4, 1762 which also repeated the above
words.
I conclude from the foregoing that the Treaty of 1752 was not termi-
nated by subsequent hostilities in 1753. The Treaty is of as much force and
effect today as it was at the time it was concluded.'
Despite these comments and the doctrine of resjudicata, some hold the
view that the language used by the Supreme Court still leaves it open to
the Crown to lead evidence and to argue that the Treaty of 1752 was
terminated by subsequent hostilities. 10
8. Ibid. at p. 405-06 [SCR] [emphasis added].
9. Ibid. at p. 404-05.
10. The particular language usually relied upon is the following reference at p. 404: "The
inconclusive and conflicting evidence presented by the parties makes it impossible for this
Court to say with any certainty what happened on the eastern coast of Nova Scotia 233 years
ago. As a result, the Court is unable to resolve this historical question". These comments may
then be coupled with the several references at p. 403, 405 and 415 to the treaty not being
"terminated by subsequent hostilities in 1753". See R. v. Johnson (S.G.) (1990), 122 N.S.R.
(2d) 280, 338 A.P.R. 280 (Prov. Ct.); R. v. Marshall (D.I., Jr.) interlocutory ruling Nov. 24,
1994 (Prov. Ct.). However, arguably the Simon case is a judicial determination in rem on the
status of a thing, i.e., the treaty. Since the Crown cannot split its case into termination in this
year and then later argue for termination in a different year (the Province in fact argued and
provided evidence in Simon concerning hostilities and subsequent treaties to and including
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The Treaty of 1752 contains two clauses of importance to the right to
fish. First, Article 4 of the Treaty says that those taking the benefit of the
Treaty "shall not be hindered from, but have free liberty of hunting and
fishing as usual" [emphasis added]. The hunting aspect of that clause was
the direct subject of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Simon.
The second important clause with respect to fishing rights also comes
from Article 4 and states:
if they [the Mi'kmaq beneficiaries] shall think a Truck house needful at the
River Chibenaccadie [Shubenacadie River], or any other place of their
resort they shall have the same built and proper Merchandize, lodged
therein to be exchanged for what the Indians shall have to dispose of and
that in the mean time the Indians shall have free liberty to bring for Sale
to Halifax or any other Settlement within this Province, Skins, feathers,
fowl,fish or any other thing they shall have to sell, where they shall have
liberty to dispose thereof to the best advantage. [emphasis added]
This clause obviously contemplates commercial transactions in such
natural products as fish. In the Simon case, the Supreme Court noted that
the treaty protection was not limited to hunting for non-commercial
purposes. The Court stated that "article 4 of the Treaty appears to
contemplate hunting for commercial purposes when it refers to the
construction of a truck house as a place of exchange and mentions the
liberty of the Micmac to bring game to sale"l"
These clauses must be interpreted in light of the principles set out by
the courts for the interpretation of Indian treaties. The most authoritative
statement of the principles was provided by the Supreme Court in Simon:
... Indian treaties should be given a fair, large and liberal construction in
favour of the Indians. This principle of interpretation was most recently
affirmed by this Court in Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29. I
had occasion to say the following at p. 36:
It is legal lore that, to be valid, exemptions to tax laws should be
clearly expressed. It seems to me, however, that treaties and statutes
relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful
expressions resolved in favour of the Indians .... In Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U. S, 1 (1899), it was held that Indian treaties "must...
be construed, not according to the technical meaning of [their] words
.. but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by
the Indians" .12
1761, but the SCC does not clearly deal with this evidence and these arguments), once the status
of the treaty has been finally pronounced, it is binding against the world. See Spencer Bower
and Sir A.K. Turner, TheDoctrine ofResJudicata 2ded. (London: Butterworths, 1969) at 213.
11. Supra, note 7 at 403 [SCR].
12. Ibid. at 402 [SCR] [eniphasis added].
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Thus, in directing that a "fair, large and liberal construction in favour of
the Indians" be taken, the Supreme Court mandates that the treaties be
interpreted in the way "they would naturally be understood by the
Indians." This approach was applied by Chief Justice Dickson to the
issues involved in Simon, and was later followed in R. v. Sioui13.
As significant as the Simon case is, several other events are important
to understanding the Mi'kmaq right to fish. These events are, first, the
1982 changes to the Constitution of Canada, second, the decision of the
Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Appeal Division, in R. v. Denny, Paul and
Sylliboy 4 , and third, the recognition in the Charlottetown Accord of the
inherent right of Aboriginal self-government and of Aboriginal govern-
ments as one the three orders of government in Canada.
Through these milestones, all achieved in the last decade, the Aborigi-
nal and treaty rights of the Mi'kmaq have finally assumed centre-stage in
the legal and political discourse between Mi'kmaq and non-Mi'kmaq.
Such Aboriginal and treaty rights are the key to understanding the
relationship of Mi'kmaq with non-Aboriginal society; they are the foun-
dations from which political and legal arrangements derive. All members
of both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies, who must live and
interact together, will benefit from a greater understanding of these rights.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a foundation to that understand-
ing, and to suggest aspects of what the future may look like for the
Mi'kmaq in the fishery. Though litigation has confirmed the right of
Mi'kmaq to harvest fish for food (as long as the needs of conservation
have been met), present, on-going litigation and negotiations seek to
define the future participation of the Mi'kmaq in both commercial
activities and in the co-management of, and self-government in, the
fisheries.
I. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982
Prior to 198211, Aboriginal and treaty rights were vulnerable to adverse
government action. The common law did not give much, if any, legal
force and effect to such rights. Whenever the colonial (pre-Confederation,
13. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, at 1035-36 (1990), 70 D.L.R. (4th) 427, 109 N.R. 22, [1990] 3
C.N.L.R. 127 (hereinafter cited to C.N.L.R.]. Note that modem, 20th Century treaties may not
be subject to the same principles of interpretation. See Sioui at 1036, R. v. Howard (12 May
1994), Doc. 22999 (S.C.C.).
14. (1990), 94 N.S.R. (2d) 253, 247 A.P.R. 253 (S.C., A.D.).
15. 1982 was the year the Constitution of Canada was patriated from Great Britain. This was
accomplished by the enactment by the Imperial Parliament in Great Britain of the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, S. 35 is contained in Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, namely,
the Constitution Act, 1982.
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i.e., before 1867), provincial, or federal (post-Confederation) govern-
ments enacted legislation, the courts enforced the legislation no matter
what the Indian treaties or the Indians themselves said. The only legal
exception to this preference for non-Aboriginal legislation was accorded
by s. 88 of the Indian Act 16.
Section 88 contains the only explicit reference to Indian treaties in any
Canadian statute. It provides, in part:
88. Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all
laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are
applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province.... [emphasis
added]
This provision was interpreted to protect treaty rights (not Aboriginal
or other native rights) against conflicting provincial laws, though not
conflicting federal laws. 17 Section 88 of the Indian Act is central to the
outcome in the Simon case, for it was s. 99 that directed the court to give
legal effect to the terms of the Treaty of 1752 in the face of the conflicting
hunting laws of the province. But s. 88 has been interpreted by the courts
as not applying to conflicting federal laws. Thus, while there are no
instances where a provincial or the Federal government purported to
explicitly and expressly extinguish or terminate or limit a treaty, the
Supreme Court of Canada sanctioned the indirect restriction of treaty
rights by upholding and applying general federal legislation that con-
flicted with a treaty right.
In addition to this problem, s. 88 makes no reference to Aboriginal
rights. Aboriginal rights are a concept distinct from treaty rights since
they are rights based on original occupancy of territory rather than an
agreement between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal nations. Nowhere
does a statute make reference to the Aboriginal rights of the Mi'kmaq or
other Aboriginal peoples. Without statutory (or constitutional) recogni-
tion, Aboriginal rights were vulnerable to legislative action by non-
Aboriginal governments.
Thus, prior to 1982, Mi'kmaq treaty rights prevailed because of s. 88
of the Indian Act when they came against conflicting provincial laws.
However, treaty rights did not prevail as against federal laws, and
Aboriginal rights did not prevail as against either provincial or federal
laws. Against this background, in which for the most part Aboriginal and
treaty rights sat in a form of legal limbo, the importance of the constitu-
tional changes effected in 1982 can be assessed.
16. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5, s. 88.
17. See e.g.R.v. Kruger and Manuel, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104 (1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 434; R. v.
Dick, [19851 2 S.C.R. 309.
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Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 states:
35. (1) The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples
of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
Subsection 35 (2) defines "Aboriginal peoples of Canada" to include "the
Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada", one of which is clearly the
Mi'kmaq.
Of importance is the fact that s. 35(1) recognizes both Aboriginal and
treaty rights, and forms part of the Constitution of Canada. The Mi'kmaq
in Nova Scotia possess both forms of rights. This is unique because in
most of Canada, Indian treaties are designed to extinguish Aboriginal
land rights and limit some other rights, such as those to hunt and fish, in
exchange for the treaty promises. However, the treaties in the Maritimes
are designed to establish a relationship of peace and friendship with the
British Crown, and not to cede lands or rights. Therefore, as the Supreme
Court of Canada recognized in Simon, the Treaty of 1752 (and the other
Nova Scotia treaties) generally confirm pre-existing Aboriginal rights,
including the right to hunt and fish. Thus, Aboriginal rights co-exist along
side of treaty rights.
The fact that the Mi'kmaq Aboriginal and treaty rights are "recognized
and affirmed" in the Constitution of Canada is significant because it gives
these rights constitutional protection. The Constitution of Canada is the
supreme law of the country, and to the extent that any law is inconsistent
with the constitution, it is of no force and effect. 8 Thus, since the
Mi'kmaq have by virtue of s. 35(1) a constitutional right to fish, that
Mi'kmaq right prevails over inconsistent laws and actions of the federal
and provincial governments.
To provide meat to the bare-bones discussion above, the next three
sections address the Mi'kmaq right to fish based, first, on treaties, then on
an Aboriginal right to fish as reflected in Denny, Paul and Sylliboy. The
third topic will be the meaning given to s. 35(1) by the Supreme Court in
R. v. Sparrow9 and the constitutional protection it offers Aboriginal and
treaty rights.
II. The Treaty Right to Fish
As explained above, the Treaty of 1752 that was the subject of the Simon
case makes specific reference to the right of the Mi'kmaq to fish and to
sell any fish harvested. In addition, the Treaty of 1725, originally signed
by the Mi'kmaq from Cape Sable and ratified at Annapolis Royal in 1726
18. This has always been the case, but is made explicit by s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
19. [19901 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 111 N.R. 241 [hereinafter cited to D.L.R.].
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by many Mi'kmaq from across Nova Scotia, provided that the Mi'kmaq
"shall not be molested in their persons, Hunting, Fishing and planting
grounds nor in any other their lawful Occasions".
These are the only two explicit references to fishing in the Mi'kmaq
documents signed by or with respect to present-day Nova Scotia. How-
ever, other documents were signed or adopted by various groups of
Mi'kmaq in 1749, the period shortly after the Treaty of1752, in 1760 and
1761, and finally at the time of the American Revolution, in 1779. At the
same time the Government in Nova Scotia also signed treaties with the
Malecite from the Saint John River and the Passamaquoddy from the bay
of the same name at the Maine-New Brunswick border. Many of these
treaties, including the Treaty of 1752, make express reference to the
Treaty of 1725 and ratify, confirm, and incorporate the 1725 Treaty.
Whether expressed explicitly or not, surely the right to fish, along with
the right to hunt and gather, was an undertying assumptin on which all
the treaties were based. The parties' course of conduct demonstrates this.
Before the treaty the Micmac were free to hunt and fish, and did so to
provide food and furs; after the signing of the treaties nothing changed.
The Micmac were not provided with all their food and clothing for the
next year; they were expected to provide for themselves by hunting,
fishing and gathering. No one expected otherwise. Indeed the British
supplied the Micmac with shot and powder so that they could hunt and,
in 1760-61, with truckhouses so they could sell the fruit of their activities!
Thus, it may be reasonably suggested that all the treaties, either
explicitly or implicitly, confirm the right of the Mi'kmaq to fish. Cer-
tainly the right to fish would form one of the assumptions and premises
upon which the treaties are based. Since between 1725 and 1761 all of the
various groups of Mi'kmaq from all over present-day Nova Scotia,
including Cape Breton Island, signed treaties with the English, and the
Mi'kmaq beneficiaries of those treaties intermarried and moved through-
out the region, we may conclude that all Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia today
enjoy a right to fish based on the covenant chain of treaties. In all
likelihood, all Mi'kmaq enjoy the same set of treaty rights based on the
covenant chain, and that set of rights includes the right to sell fish, as
expressly set out in the treaties in 1725-26, 1752 and 1779, and as
impliedly included in the trading provisions in 1760-61.
As explained above, s. 88 of the Indian Act gives treaty rights priority
over inconsistent provincial laws. Since virtually all fisheries regulation
takes the form of federal laws (based on the legislative jurisdiction over
"Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries" conferred on the federal Parliament in
s. 91(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867), s. 88 is not of any assistance as
a basis for giving legal recognition to a treaty-based right to fish.
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However, s. 35(l) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being a constitutional
provision, takes supremacy over federal as well as provincial laws.
Therefore, subject to what is discussed below in relation to the Sparrow
case, a treaty-based right to fish takes priority over inconsistent fisheries
laws.
III. The Aboriginal Right to Fish: Denny, Paul and Sylliboy
For more than one hundred years after Confederation, the status of the
concept of Aboriginal title and rights remained uncertain in Canadian
law. In 1973 the Supreme Court of Canada in Calder v. A.G.B.C. 20 for the
first time authoritatively settled that Canadian law recognized that
Aboriginal people enjoyed special rights based on their original occu-
pancy of the land. Calder was summarized by Dickson, J. (later Chief
Justice of Canada) in Guerin v. The Queen21. Writing the principal
judgment under the sub-title "The existence of Indian title", he states:
In Calder et al. v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R.
313, this Court recognized aboriginal title as a legal right derived from the
Indians' historic occupation and possession of their tribal lands.22
In Calder, six of the seven judges deciding the case expressly dealt with
Aboriginal rights and all six recognized that the concept of "aboriginal
title existed in Canada".
Mr. Justice Dickson in Guerin refers with approval to Chief Justice
Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court in Johnson v. M'Intosh, who said that
"the rights of Indians in the lands they traditionally occupied prior to
European colonization both predated and survived the claims to sover-
eignty made by various European nations in the territories of the North
American continent".23 As Marshall, C.J. put it: "[The original inhabit-
ants] were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal
as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to
their own discretion".
However, Calder left unsettled many questions, such as whether
Aboriginal rights survived the granting of land by the Crown and the
occupancy of such lands by settlers. For example, in Nova Scotia, the
Appeal Division of the Province's Supreme Court upheld a Mi'kmaq
right to hunt on reserve lands free of provincial conservation laws, but
suggested that the rights had been extinguished off-reserve except in
20. [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 1.
21. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 55 N.R. 161 [hereinafter cited to S.C.R.].
22. Ibid. at 376-77.
23. 8 Wheaton 543 (1823), 21 U.S. 240 cited in ibid. at 377.
The Mi'kmaq and the Fishery: Beyond Food Requirements
relation to ungranted Crown lands: Isaac v. The Queen24. In Isaac,
MacKeigan, C.J. states:
In Part II of these reasons I conclude that Indians on Nova Scotia
reserves have a usufructuary right in the reserve land, a legal right to use
that land and its resources, including, of course, the right to hunt on that
land. In my opinion that right arises in our customary or common law, was
confirmed by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and other authoritative
declarations, was preserved in respect of reserve lands when they were
originally set apart for the Indians....
That right, sometimes called "Indian title" is an interest in land akin to
aprofit aprendre. It arose long before 1867 but has not been extinguished
as to reserve land .... 25
Chief Justice MacKeigan also noted that the British received their title to
Nova Scotia from the French but that when Governor Belcher spoke of
this issue he
erred in not recognizing the "burden of Indian rights" overlying that title
[derived from the French]. Neither the French nor British had extinguished
the Indian rights in Nova Scotia.
26
The Chief Justice also reviews briefly the treaties up to 1779 and
concludes:
I have been unable to find any record of any treaty, agreement or
arrangement after 1780 extinguishing, modifying or confirming the Indian
right to hunt and fish, or any other record of any cession or release of rights
or lands by the Indians.
27
Aboriginal rights are at the heart of the Mi'kmaq right to fish. The
Mi'kmaq, like other Indians in Canada, enjoyed at the time of contact and
settlement Aboriginal rights. These rights included a right to fish. This
right has never been surrendered or given up by the Mi'kmaq, and no
government, pre-Confederation or post-Confederation, British or French,
Nova Scotian or Canadian, has expressly purported to extinguish the
Aboriginal right to fish. The original Aboriginal right to fish was later
confirmed by treaties and by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, but pre-
existed these documents and operates independently of them.
In 1990 the existence of an Aboriginal right on the part of Mi'kmaq to
fish was confirmed by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Appeal Division
in Denny, Paul and Sylliboy2 8. This case involved charges of illegal
fishing for salmon without a licence, illegal possession of a salmon, and
24. (1975), 13 N.S.R.(2d) 460, 9 A.P.R. 460 (S.C., A.D.).
25. Ibid. at 469.
26. Ibid. at 482.
27. Ibid. at 483.
28. Supra note 14.
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illegal fishing for cod without a licence by members of the Eskasoni Band
in the Bras d'Or Lakes, and fishing with a snare for salmon in the Afton
River by a member of the Afton Band. All three Mi'kmaq were acquitted
on the appeal on the basis that they enjoyed a limited immunity from
prosecution since the regulatory regime for fisheries management was
inconsistent with their Aboriginal right to fish. Chief Justice Clarke,
writing a unanimous judgment of the five-member panel, states that the
Mi'kmaq have "an aboriginal right to fish for food in the waters in
question" and that "this right has not been extinguished through treaty,
other agreement or competent legislation". 9 The Appeal Division goes
on to interpret s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 as requiring that a
priority be given to Aboriginal fishing after the needs of conservation are
met. As Clarke, C.J.N.S. states:
To afford user groups such as sports fishermen (anglers) a priority to fish
over the legitimate food needs of the appellants and their families is simply
not appropriate action on the part of the Federal government. It is
inconsistent with the fact that the appellants have for many years, and
continue to possess an aboriginal right to fish for food. The appellants
have, to employ the words of their counsel, a "right to share in the available
resource". This constitutional entitlement is second only to conservation
measures that may be undertaken by federal legislation."
Thus, the Court has clarified that the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia, both on
Cape Breton Island and the mainland, possess an Aboriginal right to fish
for food for themselves and their families, independent of any treaty-
based right. This right to fish is subject to the needs of conservation but
takes priority over the interests of other user groups, such as sports and
commercial fishermen. 
3
IV. Section 35(1) and Sparrow
The above discussion shows that Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia enjoy both a
treaty right and an Aboriginal right to fish for food. Section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 gives constitutional protection to this rights. The
rights are "recognized and affirmed" by the Constitution of Canada. The
29. Ibid. at 262-63.
30. Ibid. at 266.
31. Note that Denny, Paul and Sylliboy resulted in illegal hunting charges against 14
Mi'kmaq being dismissed on a defence motion made during the course of trial: Nova Scotia
Micmac Moose Harvest Cases, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 87 (N.S. Prov. Ct.). The Crown did not
oppose the motion, maintaining at 88 that Denny created "a presumption of aboriginal rights"
which the Crown, on the evidence led by it, had not rebutted. Apparently it feels that such
evidence to rebut an Aboriginal right to hunt might be led in another case, but the Crown in the
face of widespread Mi'kmaq hunting since 1990 (and the expiry of two subsequent conserva-
tion agreements) has not laid charges or attempted to rebut the existence of Aboriginal rights.
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question remains, however, as to what s. 35(1) in fact does by way of
protection. The answer, at least in part, was given by the Supreme Court
of Canada in R. v. Sparrow32.
Sparrow was a case based on an Aboriginal right to fish. The case did
not discuss in detail the Aboriginal right to fish. The existence of the right
had not been seriously disputed in the lower courts, and the Supreme
Court was not prepared to disturb the findings in those courts. Though the
real subject of controversy was the effect of the Fisheries Act33 and its
regulations in restricting those rights, the Court stepped beyond the fact
that Aboriginal rights are sui generis (i.e., unique, one of a kind)34 to note
that existing rights "must be interpreted flexibly so as to permit their
evolution over time"35. Further, in giving definition to an Aboriginal
right, "it is possible, and, indeed, crucial, to be sensitive to the Aboriginal
perspective itself on the meaning of the rights at stake"36 .
Sparrow was a member Tof the Musqueam Band and was fishing for
salmon for food with a drift net some 45 fathoms in length. A food fishing
licence had been issued to the Band under the terms of which the
permissible length of drift net was set at 25 fathoms. This restriction
represented a reduction from that previously permitted the Band under its
licence (the previously permitted length seems to have been 75 fath-
oms).3 7 Sparrow argued that this reduction and restriction was inconsis-
tent with his Aboriginal right to fish for food and ceremonial purposes.
The federal government argued that the right to fish had been, prior to
1982, a regulated right, i.e., a right that Indians could only exercise if they
fished in accordance with the Fisheries Act and regulations. After 1982,
the federal government argued, the effect of the word "existing" in the
phrase "existing aboriginal and treaty rights" as contained in s. 35(1), was
to retain the pre-1982 position. That is, they argued that the right after
1982 was equally subject to regulation by the FisheriesAct and regulations.
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the word "existing" meant
simply that the right had not been extinguished prior to 198238. In other
words, if the right had been extinguished prior to 1982, then the enact-
ment of s. 35(1) in the Constitution Act, 1982 did not have the effect of
reviving the rights. Even though prior to 1982 the right to fish was subject
to the Fisheries Act, the effect of this was not to extinguish the right to fish.
32. Supra note 19.
33. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14.
34. Supra note 19 at 408 and 411.
35. Ibid. at 397.
36. Ibid. at 411.
37. Ibid. at 397.
38. Ibid. at 395.
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After 1982, the effect of s. 35(1) was to make the Fisheries Act and
regulations subject to scrutiny as against the constitutional guarantee. If
the Fisheries Act and regulations were inconsistent with the constitu-
tional guarantee of the Aboriginal right to fish, then the court could not
automatically apply the fisheries regulations. Rather, the Aboriginal right
to fish would prevail (unless the government met a stringent standard of
justification).
Having recognized the right to fish as existing and as under the
protection of the constitution, the Supreme Court went on to consider
whether infringements by the government of the right to fish could be
justified. One of the significant aspects of the Sparrow case is that the
Supreme Court, in considering the potential for conflict between Aborigi-
nal rights and important objectives sought by the government, laid out a
legal test for determining when actions by provincial and federal govern-
ments might prevail even though they infringed the constitutional guar-
antee of Aboriginal rights. In essence, the Court said that the constitu-
tional guarantee of Aboriginal rights was not absolute, and had to yield
to government action that met a high test of justification. Though s. 35 is
not part of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme
Court implied a limitation upon the rights guaranteed by s. 3539 very
similar to that contained in s. 1 of the Charter and elaborated in R. v.
Oakes4 .
Thus, in approaching s. 35(1) issues, a court must work its way through
a number of steps; it must answer a series of questions; it must consider
a number of factors. The process may be summarized as follows.
1. Infringement
The first question to ask is: Does the legislation in question have the effect
of interfering with or infringing an "existing aboriginal right"? 4 The
burden to show this primafacie interference is on the person arguing that
the right is being infringed, normally, an Aboriginal. If someone is
arguing that the right has been terminated or extinguished, normally the
Crown, the burden is on that person to show extinguishment. Any alleged
acts of extinguishment must be clear and plainly intended to effect
extinguishment.42
In determining if the Aboriginal right has been infringed, certain more
detailed questions must be asked:
39. Ibid. at 409.
40. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200.
41. Supra note 19 at 411.
42. Ibid. at 401.
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(a) is the limitation imposed by government unreasonable?
(b) does the regulation impose undue hardship?
(c) does the regulation deny Aboriginals their preferred means of
exercising the right?43
Furthermore, to determine if the protected Aboriginal interest is in-
fringed, one may look at the effect of the government's action as well as
the government's purpose." In other words, even if the government did
not intend to infringe an Aboriginal right, the court will find an infringe-
ment if the effect or impact of its action is to impair the right.
2. Justification
If there is aprimafacie infringement or denial of an Aboriginal right, the
next question to ask is whether the interference is justified?45
The burden is on the Crown to show that the interference with the right
is justified. To meet this burden, the government must address two issues.
a. Valid Government Objective
First, is there a valid legislative objective? The objective sought to be
accomplished by the Crown must be "compelling and substantial". In the
case of the fisheries restrictions, the Supreme Court states that conserva-
tion and resource management is a valid objective. As well, prevention
of "harm to the general populace or to aboriginal peoples themselves",
would be sufficiently compelling government objectives, while some-




The second part of the justification test is whether the Crown has acted
in a way consistent with upholding the honour of the Crown and its
fiduciary obligation to Aboriginal people. As the Supreme Court states:
[t]he honour of the Crown is at stake in dealings with aboriginal peoples.
The special trust relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-
A-vis aboriginals must be the first consideration in determining whether the
legislation or action in question can be justified. 7
43. Ibid. at 411.
44. Ibid. at 412.
45. Ibid. at 412.
46. Ibid. at 412.
47. Ibid. at413.
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The Court emphasizes the importance of the fiduciary relationship. It
states:
In our opinion, Guerin, together with R. v. Taylor and Williams (1981), 62
C.C.C. (2d) 34 O.R. (2d) 360 227, (C.A.), ground a general guiding
principle for s. 35(1). That is, the government has the responsibility to act
in a fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship
between the Government and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial,
and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be
defined in light of this historic relationship.48
This statement of a "general guiding principle" seems to provide a
universal basis on which to assess the actions of the federal and provincial
governments in respect of any decision or policy made by them, not just
matters related to Aboriginal and treaty rights. Furthermore, the Court
endorses "the concept of holding the Crown to a high standard of
honourable dealing with respect to the aboriginal peoples of Canada"49 .
The pursuit of a conservation objective, the Supreme Court says in
Sparrow, "in a heavily used modem fishery inevitably blurs with the
efficient allocation and management of this scarce and valued resource",
and therefore demands in this context a link to the allocation of priorities
in the fishery. 0 The Supreme Court goes on to state, in what may be the
most important paragraph in the case concerning the fisheries, the
following:
The constitutional nature of the Musqueam food fishing rights means that
any allocation of priorities after valid conservation measures have been
implemented must give top priority to Indian food fishing. If the objective
pertained to conservation, the conservation plan would be scrutinized to
assess priorities. While the detailed allocation of maritime resources is a
task that must be left to those having expertise in the area, the Indians' food
requirements must be met first when that allocation is established. The
significance of giving the aboriginal right to fish for food top priority can
be described as follows. If, in a given year, conservation needs required a
reduction in the number of fish to be caught such that the number equalled
the number required for food by the Indians, then all the fish available after
conservation would go to the Indians according to the constitutional nature
of their fishing right. If, more realistically, there were still fish after the
Indian food requirements were met, then the brunt of conservation mea-
sures would be borne by the practices of sport fishing and commercial
fishing.51
The Supreme Court specifically refers to the Denny, Paul and Sylliboy
case and states that the Nova Scotia Court addresses the constitutionality
48. Ibid. at 408.
49. Ibid. at 409.
50. Ibid. at 413.
51. Ibid. at414.
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of the Mi'kmaq's right to fish "in a way that accords with our understand-
ing of the constitutional nature of aboriginal rights and the link between
allocation and justification required for government regulation of the
exercise of the rights".52 Perhaps because of the Supreme Court's
favourable comments on the Nova Scotia case, the Attorney General of
Canada withdrew an application the Crown had filed for leave to appeal
Denny, Paul and Sylliboy to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Court in Sparrow also notes that, depending on the circumstances,
there are other questions that must be addressed by the government when
it seeks to justify its actions as being consistent with the honour of the
Crown. Has there been as little infringement as possible? If there has been
expropriation of Aboriginal rights, is fair compensation available? Has
there been consultation with the Aboriginal group in question? This list
of considerations mentioned by the Court is not exhaustive, and other
factors may be important depending on the circumstances.13 The key is to
assess whether the Crown has acted honourably in keeping with its
fiduciary obligation when it pursues a sufficiently compelling objective.
The Sparrow case involved an Aboriginal right to fish, not a treaty-
based right. Would the same or a similar justification test apply for treaty
rights? In particular, how could overriding the terms of a treaty ever be
consistent with upholding the honour of the Crown? If the terms of a
treaty are clear, on what basis can limitations be implied? Likely some
limitations will be read into either treaties themselves or their constitu-
tional protection. In the Simon case the Supreme Court read the require-
ments of public safety into the exercise of the treaty right to hunt.54 Likely,
a court would read resource conservation into a treaty right to fish on the
basis that the continued existence of the resource was a fundamental
assumption of the guarantee. However, one may reasonably suggest that
a justification test that applies to treaties ought to be more rigorous and
stringent in light of the fact that they contain specific promises by the
Crown. One may assert that the clearer and more express a treaty promise,
the higher the standard of justification imposed on the Crown. Probably,
express promises must be upheld and cannot be ignored or overridden by
governments, for to do so would change the deal made and amount to
unilateral abrogation. Therefore, it may be that treaty rights enjoy greater
protection than Aboriginal rights and any infringement is subject to
stricter scrutiny requiring stronger justification.5
52. Ibid. at 414,
53. Ibid. at 416-17.
54. Supra note 7 at 403 and 414.
55. Note that the Ontario Court of Appeal inR. v. Bombay (M.) etal. held that the framework
provided in Sparrow is equally applicable to treaty rights, citing R. v. Joseph, [19901
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Another implication of Sparrow relates to the role of Aboriginal
people in the co-management of the fisheries resource. Sparrow empha-
sizes the importance of protecting the resource. The Court refers to
"Parliament's ability and responsibility" to create and administer "over-
all conservation and management plans regarding the salmon fishery".56
However, the Court also says that such plans must "treat aboriginal
peoples in a way ensuring that their rights are taken seriously" s. 7 The
Court also emphasizes the dependence of Aboriginal people on the
resource for food and ceremonial purposes, their priority over other
resource users, the fiduciary obligation of the Crown, and the importance
of compensation and consultation. Indeed at one point the Supreme Court
states: "Section 35(1), at the least, provides a solid constitutional base
upon which subsequent negotiations can take place" and adopts a
quotation from an article by Professor Noel Lyon in which he notes:
"Section 35 calls for ajust settlement for aboriginal peoples".58 Arguably
these factors and statements suggest that Aboriginal people have a legal
stake in resource conservation and management, have the legal right to
challenge government action detrimental to the resource and the environ-
ment on which renewable resources depends, and have the right to be
consulted and to engage in fair negotiations to settle resource manage-
ment issues. The Mi'kmaq have a major role to play in resource manage-
ment decisions, and governments must provide Aboriginal groups with
meaningful participation in the development of conservation and
management plans.
V. Self-Government
The notion of co-management in the preceding paragraph raises the issue
of self-government. One of the self-government questions concerns the
mechanism by which the Mi'kmaq community interacts with non-
Aboriginal governments to determine such matters as management plans.
This function has long been carried out, often through organizations such
as the Union of Nova Scotia Indians, the Confederacy of Mainland
Micmacs, and the Native Council of Nova Scotia. Another question
related to self-government concerns the internal governing of the Mi'kmaq
Nation. This second aspect of self-government is important to fisheries
because it concerns the ability of the Mi'kmaq to create conservation and
4 C.N.L.R. 59 (B.C.S.C.). See R. v. Bombay, [1993] 1 CNLR 92 (Ont. C.A.) at 94, (1993), 61
O.A.C. 312 [hereinafter cited to O.A.C.].
56. Supra note 19 at 416.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid. at 406.
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management regimes that will apply to its members. For example, if the
Mi'kmaq and the federal government develop together a management
scheme that applies to a particular resource, the implementation of that
regime might best be done by the federal government regulating non-
Mi'kmaq and the Mi'kmaq taking responsibility for implementation vis-
a-vis Mi'kmaq. In so doing, the Mi'kmaq would be governing themselves.
The so-called "Charlottetown Accord" on constitutional renewal in
Canada was defeated in a referendum held in October, 1992. One of the
key clauses of the deal agreed to by representatives of all ten provincial
governments, the two territories, the Federal government, and four
Aboriginal organizations, recognized that Aboriginal peoples have the
inherent right of self-government. The Premier of Nova Scotia and the
leaders of the Liberal and New Democratic parties made a joint presen-
tation to the House of Commons-Senate Joint Committee on the
Constitution wherein they recognized that Aboriginal self-government
was an inherent Aboriginal right. Though the legal effect of these
agreements and statements may not be certain, they help all understand
that Aboriginal peoples such as the Mi'kmaq were traditionally self-
governing and that the right to exercise powers of self-government and
be self-governing may be an Aboriginal right already included in s. 35(1).
Certainly the Mi'kmaq take the view that the right of self-government is
inherent, and is both an unextinguished Aboriginal right and a treaty right
included in the covenant chain.
Support for this view can be derived from legal sources. For example,
in such recent decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada as R. v. Sioui,
the Court regularly refers of the Huron in that case as a "nation". These
comments are made by the Supreme Court:
Both Great Britain and France felt that the Indian nations had sufficient
independence and played a large enough role in North America for it to be
good policy to maintain relations with them very close to those maintained
between sovereign nations.
The mother countries did everything in their power to secure the alliance
of each Indian nation and to encourage nations allied with the enemy to
change sides. When these efforts met with success, they were incorporated
in treaties of alliance or neutrality. This clearly indicates that the Indian
nations were regarded in their relations with European nations which
occupied North America as independent nations.... [Niation-to-nation
relations had to be conducted with the North American Indians... .As the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court said in 1832 in Worcester
v. State of Georgia ... 'she [Great Britain] considered them as nations
capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war: of governing
themselves, under her protection: and she made treaties with them, the
obligation of which she acknowledged' [emphasis in original]. Further,
both the French and the English recognized the critical importance of
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alliances with the Indians, or at least their neutrality, in determining the
outcome of the war between them and the security of the North American
colonies.
Following the crushing defeats of the English by the French in 1755, the
English realized that control of North America could not be acquired
without the co-operation of the Indians. Accordingly, from then on they
made efforts to ally themselves with as many Indian nations as possible.
England also wished to secure the friendship of the Indian nations by
treating them with generosity and respect for fear that the safety and
development of the colonies and their inhabitants would be compromised
by Indians with feelings of hostility.
It [British Crown] also allowed them autonomy in their internal affairs,
intervening in this area as little as possible".
59
In Worcester v. Georgia', the case quoted above, Chief Justice
Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the relationship between
the British and the Indians this way:
Fierce and warlike in their character, they might be formidable enemies,
or effective friends. Instead of rousing their resentments, by asserting
claims to their lands, or to dominion over their persons, their alliance was
sought by flattering professions, and purchased by rich presents. The
English, the French, and the Spaniards, were equally competitors for their
friendship and their aid. Not well acquainted with the exact meaning of
words, nor supposing it to be material whether they were called the
subjects, or the children of their father in Europe; lavish in professions of
duty and affection, in return for the rich presents they received; so long as
their actual independence was untouched, and their right to self govern-
ment acknowledged, they were willing to profess dependence on the
power which furnished supplies of which they were in absolute need, and
restrained dangerous intruders from entering their country; and this was
probably the sense in which the term was understood by them.
Certain it is, that our history furnishes no example, from the first
settlement of our country, of an attempt on the part of the crown to interfere
with the internal affairs of the Indians, farther than to keep out the agents
of foreign powers, who, as traders or otherwise, might seduce them into
foreign alliances. The king purchased their lands when they were willing
to sell, at a price they were willing to take; but never coerced a surrender
of them. He also purchased their alliance and dependence by subsidies; but
never intruded into the interior of their affairs, or interfered with their self
government, as far as respected themselves only.
59. Supra note 13 at 145-46 [emphasis added].
60. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, indepen-
dent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil,from time immemorial, with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them
from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discov-
erer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction
which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the
Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a
people distinct from others." . . . The words "treaty" and "nation" are
words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative
proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood
meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the
other nations of the earth.
61
These excerpts help demonstrate that certain assumptions underlie the
treaty process, and are arguably incorporated into them by implication.
The conduct of the parties before, during, and subsequent to the signing
of the treaties reflects the assumption that the Indian parties to the treaties
were regarded by the Crown as discrete, cohesive entities, i.e., "nations",
enjoying a measure of independent autonomy. They could decide whether
to sign treaties or not. Their internal integrity was unaffected by the treaty
process. Subject to the specific terms of the treaties, the Indian parties had
after, as well as before signing, internal sovereignty, i.e. "autonomy in
their internal affairs". The Crown did not presume to interfere in internal
Indian affairs. The Crown approached the Indian nations on the basis that
problems were to be solved through co-operation, negotiation, and quid
pro quo bargaining, rather than unilateral imposition.
The history and policy were the same in Nova Scotia. There is no
evidence of any attempt by the British in the years immediately following
the signing of treaties to interfere with the internal affairs of the Mi'kmaq
or to limit their ability to harvest the fisheries resource. Self-government
was an Aboriginal right that pre-existed the treaties and that was incor-
porated by implication into them as a treaty right.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada in Sparrow also clarified
the collective, as opposed to individual, nature of Aboriginal rights. At
one point the Court stated that Aboriginal fishing rights "are rights held
by a collective and are in keeping with the culture and existence of that
group".62 At a second point the Court also calls the Aboriginal right to fish
for food a "collective aboriginal right".63 These statements support the
view that the Aboriginal rights of a particular group belong to the
Aboriginal nation as a whole, and therefore may be protected and
61. Ibid. at 546-560 [emphasis added].
62. Supra note 19 at 411.
63. Ibid. at 417.
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controlled by the Aboriginal nation against the actions of an individual
Aboriginal person or group of individuals.
Thus, the point may be made that the Mi'kmaq are an Aboriginal
nation possessing the inherent right of self-government. As such, they
have the fight to regulate the fishing activities of its members. Co-
management of the fisheries resource is a realistic goal. The Mi'kmaq, for
their part, have sufficient powers of self-government now to uphold their
side of any management plans through regulatory regimes they put in
place. To the extent that any non-Aboriginal government doubts this now,
clarification of powers of self-government through federal Indian legis-
lation is one possible solution. However, surely it meant something when
all governments in Canada recognized the existence of an inherent right
of Aboriginal self-government. This political recognition propels the
Mi'kmaq toward legal recognition of their right to govern themselves.
VI. Present Developments-Future Directions
Several additional developments suggest future directions. First, at the
time of writing an important court case is unfolding. Donald Marshall, Jr.,
the Mi'kmaq who has become symbolic of injustice to Aboriginal people
through the white-dominated court system,64 faces several fisheries
charges arising out catching and selling eels at Pomquet Harbour,
Antigonish County. The basic facts of the case are agreed upon, and the
case is being used as vehicle to litigate the Aboriginal and treaty rights of
the Mi'kmaq to sell, trade, barter or exchange fish. Of central importance
is the application and interpretation of the "free liberty to trade" clause of
the Treaty of 1752 and the "trade at truckhouse" clauses in the 1760 and
1761 Mi'kmaq treaties. Likely, an Aboriginal right to trade will also be
asserted. The treaty provisions and different evidence of Aboriginal
trading practices may result in a different outcome than that reached in
several British Columbia decisions presently before the Supreme Court
of Canada:R. v. Vanderpeet6 ,R. v. Gladstone66,R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse
Ltd.", and Nikal68.
64. See B.H. Wildsmith, "Getting at Racism" (1991) 55 Sask. L. R. 97.
65. (1993), 80 B.C.L.R.(2d) 75 (C.A.)-leave to SCC granted March 10, 1994 87 B.C.L.R.(2d)
(C.A.) at xxxiii.
66. (1993), 80 B.C.L.R.(2d) 133 (C.A.) - leave to SCC granted March 10, 1994 87
B.C.L.R.(2d) at xxxii.
67. (1993), 80 B.C.L.R.(2d) 158 (C.A.) - leave to SCC granted March 10, 1994 87
B.C.L.R.(2d) at xxxii.
68. (1993), 80 B.C.L.R.(2d) 245 (C.A.) - leave to SCC granted March 10, 1994 87
B.C.L.R.(2d) at xxxiii.
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Perhaps the outcome in Marshall will be similar to that in the Cape
Croker treaty case from the Bruce Peninsula area of Georgian Bay in
Ontario, R. v. Jones and Nadjiwon6 9. There the Chippewas of Nawash
Band of the Saugeen Ojibway were found to have a treaty-based, as well
as Aboriginal, right to fish commercially based on a long-standing
practice of such fishing and assurances made to them during a land
surrender in 1836. Of significance also is R. v. Bombay (M.) et al.7 ° ,
another treaty case. There the defendants were in "lay terms... charged
with fishing out of season, fishing with a prohibited net, and selling fish
out of season".7' The treaty in this case provided that the Indians "shall
have the right to pursue their avocation of hunting and fishing throughout
the tract surrendered". The Ontario Court of Appeal found that this right
had been prima facie infringed, that the Crown had not met (or attempted
to meet) its burden to show a Sparrow justification, and so quashed the
convictions.
A second matter of note is the enactment of the Aboriginal Communal
Fishing Licences Regulations72. These Regulations authorize the Minis-
ter of Fisheries to issue communal licences to Indian bands, tribal
councils and other organizations to carry on fishing and related activities.
In addition to dealing with species, quantities, gear, locations and times
of harvesting, the licence may deal with the "disposition" of the fish
caught under the licence. This, according to the "Regulatory Impact
Analysis Statement" published along with the Regulations73, may include
the sale of the fish. Further, though the Regulations themselves do not
refer to Aboriginal Fishing Agreements, the policy as reflected in the
"Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement" is to seek a negotiated Aborigi-
nal Fishing Agreement with each band or organization, and then to issue
the communal licence under the Regulations based on the Agreement. If
no Agreement is reached, the Minister may seek to impose a communal
licence unilaterally. Agreements to date in Nova Scotia have always,
despite objection from the Mi'kmaq, linked financial incentives (a so-
called Contribution Agreement) with a harvesting plan. In other words,
the Federal government will provide funds to bands to hire conservation
officers and do fisheries enhancement and management work if the band
signs an Agreement. And in the Agreement, the band is expected to
specify the details of its proposed fishing activities. Of some controversy
is a clause in most agreements that prohibits the band and its members
69. [1993] 3 C.N.L.R. 182 (Ont. Prov. Div.).
70. Supra note 55.
71. Ibid. at 313.
72. SOR/93-332.
73. Canada Gazette Part I1. vol. 127, no. 13, June 30, 1993 at 2901.
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from fishing except as outlined. Since the Department of Fisheries and
Oceans has not attempted to deal comprehensively with all species at all
times and places, but rather has restricted its interest to several major
species, namely, Atlantic salmon and lobsters, the net effect is to prohibit
fishing for species even under conditions that pose no conservation
concern. Thus, under agreements that deal with salmon and lobster,
Mi'kmaq would be prohibited from fishing for trout, eels, gaspereau,
shad, perch, cod and pollack even when no conservation concerns are
raised.
Recently, several bands were successful in securing from the Minister
agreements that reverse the onus, that is, that permit fishing and activities
in the exercise of Aboriginal and treaty rights where the agreement did not
deal with the species in question. Thus, if the band has not agreed to limit
its fishing activities with respect to a given species, then it may exercise
its Aboriginal and treaty right to fish, if it has any. It is not clear whether
such a major change in emphasis will be continued in future agreements.
Of interest is the fact that the Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licences
Regulations do not prohibit fishing without such a licence. The tenor of
the Regulations is to provide a mechanism for the Minister to issue such
licences, and for the protection from prosecution of those fishing under
the authority and subject to the conditions of the communal licence. But
the Regulations are silent about the position of those Aboriginal persons
fishing without an applicable communal licence. What of these fishers?
When the Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licences Regulations were
enacted on June 16, 1993, consequent amendments were make to the
Maritime Provinces Fishery Regulations74. Now s. 4(1)(a) provides, in
its relevant parts:
4. (1)... [N]o person shall fish for or catch and retain any fish unless
(a) the person is authorized to do so under the authority of a licence
issued under these Regulations, the Fishery (General) Regulations or the
Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licences Regulations...
Thus, in short, though the Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licences
Regulations do not make such a licence compulsory, s. 4(1)(a) above
makes a licence of one sort or the other compulsory. This seems
inconsistent with the spirit of Sparrow, which seems to place emphasis on
respecting Aboriginal preferences, consultation, and conservation-based
limitations. No doubt s. 4(1)(a) must be assessed against the constitu-
tional guarantees of s. 35; however, such a provision places the burden
and risk of litigation on any Aboriginal person who seeks to exercise a
right to fish free of unnecessary prohibitions.
74. SOR 93/55.
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If not licensing by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, then what?
This leads to the last matter: how do the Mi'kmaq wish to exercise their
Aboriginal and treaty rights to fish?
The Mi'kmaq, through the Union of Nova Scotia Indians and the
Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs, have formed an organization called
the "Aboriginal Fisheries Services" to work towards implementation of
the Mi'kmaq role in the fishery. Central to the work of the Aboriginal
Fisheries Services is a proposal to form a "Mi'kmaq Fish and Wildlife
Commission"." Though the Chiefs and Mi'kmaq leadership still have the
proposal under consideration, it was shared in August and September
1994 with both the Federal and Nova Scotia governments for their
reaction and possible negotiation. Obviously the Commission as pro-
posed would deal with Mi'kmaq harvesting in a holistic way, including
animal life as well as aquatic resources. The Mi'kmaq proposal draws
heavily for a model on the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife
Commission, which administers the off-reserve harvesting program of 13
Chippewa Bands in Minnesota, Michigan and Wisconsin, based on
Federal government funding of $ 3 million. Of particular note is the plan
to use the proposed Commission as a vehicle both for the regulatory
aspects of Mi'kmaq by Mi'kmaq and for the interaction of Mi'kmaq with
Federal and Provincial agencies for the co-management of the resources.
Professional wildlife and fisheries biologists and other environmental
and conservation specialists, as well as enforcement officers and resource
managers, might make up part of the Commission structure, enabling a
parity of expertise and authority on both sides of the negotiating table.
Though armed with rights, institutional structures, and possibly a
sympathetic public, Mi'kmaq are not immune from certain realities. First,
most fish stocks of importance are tightly regulated, posing conflicts with
Mi'kmaq aspirations. For example, the lobster fishery is not, it seems, in
collapse. Yet entry is limited to existing players. Only gradually and
modestly have the Mi'kmaq entered the commercial lobster fishery, and
75. One of the on-going concerns with any pan-Mi'kmaq institutional structure is how to
integrate the various Mi'kmaq constituencies. The Union of Nova Scotia Indians and the
Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs are two organizations through which the 13 Indian Act
bands and Chiefs work. A third major organization is the Native Council of Nova Scotia, an
organization whose traditional membership was non-status Indians but whose present leadship
asserts representation of off-reserve Mi'kmaq. Since all status Mi'kmaq are members of the 13
bands, some tension exists over who represents whom. The issue is heightened because of
issues over who are beneficiaries of land claim settlements in Nova Scotia, a subject presently
being studied by the Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research Centre of Nova Scotia. Suffice to
say for present purposes that the Native Council has set up a body called the "Netukulimkewe'l
Commission" to manage its role in harvesting fish and wildlife.
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not without disputes with government and hostilities with existing
fishermen.
Second, for many species, stocks surplus to the needs of conservation
are in short supply. Mi'kmaq ask why, if there is any surplus at all, are they
not sharing the harvest? After all, Mi'kmaq did not cause or contribute to
the collapse-they are not responsible for the shortage.
And third, for the Mi'kmaq, financial resources are and have always
been in short supply. The Mi'kmaq do not have the infrastructure-boats,
nets and other equipment, processing facilities, etc.-to exploit many
harvesting opportunities. Yet, should not a priority be accorded them to
participate, perhaps though entry preferences, buy-outs of existing opera-
tors, and co-ventures?
Conclusion
Three historic realities that cannot be ignored argue for a Mi'kmaq
priority in the commercial fishery. First, the fisheries resource was the
traditional linchpin of Mi'kmaq society and the Mi'kmaq economy. Then
the Mi'kmaq were shunted out of the commercial fishery through
economic marginalization, the lack of capital, and government policies
restricting harvesting and limiting entry. And finally, the present collapse
and crisis was not of their doing.
The future of the fisheries must take account of the Mi'kmaq. Though
the paper has focussed on the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia, the same point
may be made of the Mi'kmaq and Malecite in the other Atlantic provinces
and Quebec; their histories are intertwined. Beyond a mere sharing of the
resource as a source of food, the Mi'kmaq must be included on a priority
basis in the commercial aspects and economic benefits of the fishery.
Further, as in all aspects of the Mi'kmaq life, enhanced participation in
decision-making is essential. The management of the resource must be a
shared responsibility and a cooperative effort. And most fundamentally,
Mi'kmaq must, as an aspect of self-government, have responsibility for
Mi'kmaq and the regulatory aspects of Mi'kmaq participation.
